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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-OLD WAYS
AND NEW DIRECTIONS
Turner T. Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early years of the "Earth Day" period, environmental law
was seen by most as a set of new legal tools for a great new moral cru-
sade. Almost twenty-five years on, we now have, or ought to have, a
more subtle understanding of environmental law-an understanding that
derives from a better appreciation of the nature of environmental
problems, and of the role of law in their resolution.
This Essay contains personal reflections. It begins with a short ex-
planation of my viewpoint on the nature of environmental law. It then
examines why reflection is in order, and discusses what we have done
right and what we have done wrong. It closes by looking ahead to the
future of environmental law.
II. A PERSPECTIVE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Environmental degradation is, at base, caused by "externalities"-
costs that one economic unit imposes on others and need not reckon with
itself. Thus, environmental policy need not rely solely on morality for its
principles and execution. Much of what we want to achieve can be had
simply by understanding how and where external costs exist, what their
extent is, and how they can be reimposed on the relevant economic
actors.
Law is inextricably intertwined with environmental policy because it
is the legal structure that gives rise to the externalities. Tort, property,
contract, and procedural laws traditionally define the basic rights and
responsibilities of economic actors, thus providing the framework within
which a free market economy operates and defining which costs each
economic unit must bear. The contours set by legal systems worldwide
typically tend to reimpose only those costs that are most easily identified
and measured. The developments in environmental law of the last
twenty-five years represent an effort to move beyond these traditional
* Partner, Hunton & Williams; B.A., 1962, Princeton University; LL.B., 1968, Harvard
Law School.
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limits, using both new administrative law tools and new versions of old
liability rules.
Thus, environmental law can, in a sense, be defined as the complete
legal framework governing our interaction with the natural environment.
Viewed in this way, we have always had an environmental law, and not
simply because there were smoke control ordinances in old London. It is
at least partly for this reason that we have debated over the years
whether environmental law is a discrete and separate field of law or sim-
ply a new way of looking at all of the old fields.
As a result, environmental law, properly considered, is less a matter
of inventing new legal tools to force compliance with new moral values,
than of understanding how the old ones have failed us in achieving goals
and values we have held all along. It is also a matter of deciding how we
can restructure the legal framework we already have so as to achieve the
ends it has heretofore failed to serve in the most efficient, least disruptive
manner.
In a free-market economy, identifying the existence and determining
the extent of "external" costs has the benefit of pointing us to the basic
causes of the problems and the factor most directly relevant to the extent
and type of change needed. This approach also forces us to consider
automatically the powerful market incentives to which all economic ac-
tors-big corporations, governments, particularly when acting in their
proprietary capacity, and individuals alike-are constantly subject, yet
that operate inexorably to undermine any form of regulation that fails to
consider them. This in turn helps to avoid unintended consequences by
enabling us to foresee how the various actors in a dynamic market system
will react to new requirements, and thus how such requirements will ac-
tually work when implemented. Finally, this approach makes us alert to
opportunities to design new requirements that use the existing incentives
of the marketplace for reinforcement, or even, where possible, for
implementation.
This may seem oversimple, but it is a matter of the spirit with which
one approaches the subject. I submit that for purposes of developing
environmental policy, it is as important to understand why the desired
results are not already being achieved as it is to understand what those
results should be. It may in fact be more important, since the latter may
be fairly obvious, at least in principle, and the former much more com-
plex. Further, to understand how to achieve the results, and the specifics
of how far to pursue a policy in the face of competing objectives, an
understanding of the former may be crucial. In short, in devising effec-
tive environmental laws, it is more useful to visualize environmental law
1078 [Vol. 27:1077
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as a form of economic regulation-that is, the regulation of actors within
an economic system-than as a moral crusade.
III. WHY LOOK BACK
Starting from virtually nothing in the late 1960s, we have created in
the United States a body of statutory law, regulation, guidance, and ad-
ministrative and judicial jurisprudence that is epic in its size and scope
and Talmudic in its complexity. Annealed in the political and ideologi-
cal fires of public debate, reflecting many hard-fought compromises, and
balanced between competing forces and considerations, it now may seem
immutable.
One of its great strengths, but also one of its limitations, is that this
body of law was driven, in its creation, by specific fact situations. The
jagged definitional line drawn by the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA) between "wastes" and "products," straddling the
world of recyclables, springs to mind here.
Our current regulatory edifice is, however, by no means complete,
and it by no means has the inherent force of revealed truth. For better or
for worse, it simply represents the sum of what we have learned and
achieved to date in restructuring the legal framework within which
American society carries on its activities, so as to move toward a sustain-
able relationship between man and his supporting environment. In a
sense, United States environmental law, like the earth's rock strata and
their fossilized contents, is a historical record of the evolution of the sub-
ject, and hence of many of its policy and process successes and failures.
What use, then, can we and others make of this historical record?
All can mine it for its lessons in general policy. As lawyers specifically,
however, we should study it critically to see: where it works, and where
it does not; why it works or why it does not; and how we can generalize
about the proper role of law, legal institutions, and regulatory methods in
this field. While we spill ink constantly, and in great quantities, on these
subjects, it is not often that we take a reflective and historical approach in
doing so, and perhaps even more seldom that we attempt to learn the
cross-cutting general lessons that our experience can teach us. For exam-
ple, one looks to materials developed in-house by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) in order to find useful analysis of the proper
overall design and implementation of an environmental regulatory en-
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
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forcement program.2 Yet we have the best basis in the world for learning
such lessons. Our historical record-twenty-five years of experience-
provides a much richer and concrete set of legal rules and institutions to
draw on than exists anywhere else in the world.
Perhaps the subject is still too new and the issues too complex and
emotional for us to be able to reflect productively. Further, the difficulty
of the subject matter should not be underestimated. Restructuring the
legal framework within which humans interact with their natural envi-
ronment is no small task. Consider the complex interrelationships both
in the structure and functioning of the natural world and in the rapidly
evolving, geometrically growing global industrial economy that we are
creating. It is natural that we should grope along, case-by-case, in devel-
oping our basic factual understanding in such circumstances. Since that
understanding is the keystone to, and a prerequisite for, intelligent policy
judgments, it is also not surprising that our policy has developed in a
similar halting fashion. This is not to say that decisions cannot or should
not be made without perfect knowledge. Scientific uncertainty is epi-
demic in this field. Rather, it is simply to affirm that policy and regula-
tion based on knowledge and understanding, when it can be had on a
timely and affordable basis, is always better than policy and regulation
that is not. Notwithstanding that our efforts to date have resembled the
blind men examining the elephant, it is critical that we step back, when
we can, to learn from the process.
Learning general lessons from the field of environmental regulation
will help us to see the way ahead. It will illuminate analogous issues in
related fields of law and policy. It will provide assistance to those all
over the globe who are also struggling with the proper design and imple-
mentation of environmental regulation in their own different legal, eco-
nomic, and cultural contexts. Finally, examining our own short heritage
in environmental law dispassionately will enable us to better understand
the results being obtained in other legal and cultural systems. Compar-
ing these systems with our own, will teach us lessons in the long-ne-
glected field of comparative regulation.
2. The Environmental Protection Agency's Office of Enforcement has produced teaching
materials on the principles of environmental enforcement; it has used these instruction materi-
als in Central and Eastern Europe.
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IV. WHAT HAVE WE DONE RIGHT?
So, what have we done right and what have we done wrong? This
Essay cannot, of course, yield more than brief reflections on these points.
It will serve its purpose, however, if it provokes thought.
Starting on a positive note, an examination of environmental regula-
tion in many other countries convinces me that we have gotten many of
the basics right. First, we have properly recognized the central role that
law and effective legal institutions must play in environmental regulation.
This is particularly important in a free-market system where market sig-
nals, absent a restructuring of the legal framework within which the
game is played, give every player certain incentives to behave in a socially
incorrect way.3 In many other cultures, laws and legal institutions play a
more subordinate role; they are less well regarded, relied on, developed,
or respected.' In those cultures, many believe that environmental pro-
tection is a function of technical expertise and policy judgments alone,
with little or no role for law or lawyers-and, frequently, no role for the
public either.
My own view is that no free market can work well without clear,
well-enforced rules of the game that must, due to the existence of
externalities, include certain essential, legally binding and coercive re-
quirements regarding environmental and natural resource issues. Envi-
ronmental policy debate must address what those legal constraints
should be, how they can be most efficient, and how they can interfere
least with the proper functioning of the market. Policy decisions alone,
however, are not enough.
Likewise, volunteerism, corporate good deeds, and self-regulation
are not enough. These are all good things, and should be encouraged.
They are no substitute, however, for some form of coercive rule. Even
market-based environmental regulation relies on coercion; one is not at
liberty to decide whether to pay, as opposed to incur, environmental
taxes or charges. The way rules are made effective and brought to bear
coercively may differ widely from one culture to the next,' but coercive
they must be in some accepted form or they will be ineffective in the face
of the constant, contrary incentives of the market place-and probably of
any other system of organizing economic life, as the results of the corn-
3. For a classic analysis of economic externalities, see A.C. PIGou, THE EcONOMIcs OF
WELFARE (4th ed. 1962).
4. In Europe, for example, environmental regulation has been traditionally regarded as
the preserve of scientists, technicians, and policy makers, with lawyers considered peripheral.
5. See, e.g., Hans Van Zijst, A Change in Culture, ENVTL. F., May/June 1993, at 12
(discussing use of "voluntary covenants" in Dutch environmental law).
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mand economies in the former communist countries so tragically
demonstrate.
Whatever else may be said about our legal and regulatory systems, it
cannot be said that we lack legally binding constraints. To the contrary,
foreigners I have met criticize the United States for the legalism of our
administrative and litigation systems. While I will not defend the worst
excesses of our tort law system-for example, punitive damages-and
our administrative process-for example, essentially unlimited cross-ex-
amination in certain types of adjudicative hearings-it is my view that
foreign observers too often go to the other extreme and risk throwing the
baby out with the bath water. Whatever the proper balance may be in
tort and administrative law processes, we have at least grasped the essen-
tial need for legally binding rules in this field of regulation.
Second, we have, on the whole, properly recognized that environ-
mental regulation, while obviously and necessarily founded on technical
and scientific judgments best made by experts, deals ultimately with
value judgments about acceptable risk, and with the allocation of benefits
and burdens among today's players and between them and tomorrow's.
These are public issues-the very stuff of public debate. In our country,
they are properly seen as political issues, with all the advantages and
disadvantages that implies. In short, while environmental regulation
must be informed by expert scientific and technical judgments, the deci-
sions as to what to do must be made by the public-in our case by the
public's representatives-in an open and politically accountable process.
The legislature can and must set general policies, and in so doing
make basic political judgments. In a complex area of regulation like en-
vironmental law, however, it cannot effectively do more, although that
has not prevented our Congress from trying. Much of the detail of envi-
ronmental law must be elaborated and implemented through an adminis-
trative process, and many of the critical value judgments are necessarily
embedded in the elaboration of this detail.6 The systems we have evolved
to bring political accountability, or at least its functional substitute, to
bear on the administrative forum are thus of paramount importance.
They constitute one of the great achievements of the United States legal
system-an achievement that sets us apart from most of the other legal
systems of the world.
In the environmental field, we have made the administrative process
politically accountable in a number of ways. Perhaps the most important
6. Examples of this are the specific risk levels desired, the details of any risk assessment
methodology used, or the averaging time chosen for an environmental standard.
[Vol. 27:1077
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are (1) the relatively structured and formal administrative processes of
rule making and permitting; (2) the provisions for citizen participation in
administrative lawmaking, implementation, and enforcement, visible in
virtually every environmental statute; and (3) the well-developed system
of judicial review of administrative action.7 Indeed, the development of
these processes and others in the environmental law context has driven,
to a large extent, the development of American administrative law over
the last two decades.
Third, we have recognized the need to go beyond the mere enact-
ment of statutes to the development of effective mechanisms and institu-
tions for their implementation and enforcement. This may seem like an
obvious point, and we by no means succeed in effective implementation
and enforcement all the time. Furthermore, some may say with reason
that we implement and enforce to excess. It is clear, however, when
looking at regulation outside the United States, and particularly environ-
mental regulation, that nothing effective gets done without this. In a rel-
ative sense, the United States system of environmental regulation is a
paradigm of successful implementation and enforcement.
Fourth, we have developed very specific statutory and administra-
tive methods for making environmental regulation work in a federal sys-
tem. These include careful and complex divisions of jurisdiction between
levels of government that reflect the strengths and weaknesses of those
levels and that differ, for good reasons, with the nature of the subject
matter being regulated. For example, ambient air quality standards are
set at the federal level in part because human health needs to be pro-
tected everywhere and human response to air pollutants tends to be the
same everywhere.' Ambient water quality standards for aquatic life are
guided by the EPA's national water quality criteria, which are intended
to measure the universal response of organisms to water pollutants. 9 The
states are free, however, to apply criteria that better reflect toxicity in
particular water bodies-which will vary from state to state and water
body to water body-to the extent backed up by scientific evidence.' °
Likewise, United States environmental statutes delegate to states in
many cases the implementation and enforcement of the principles laid
down in federal law, but also contain a series of specific mechanisms that
7. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1978); see,
e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
8. 2 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 1 1.01[1] (Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds.,
1993).
9. See 2 id. § 12.0513][e][i][A].
10. See 2 id. § 12.05[3][c].
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allow the federal government to ensure that the states properly carry
through. For example, the Clean Water Act1" sets the general substan-
tive and procedural framework for water pollution regulation in the
United States, but allows the states to issue and enforce the necessary
permits.12 It also, however, (1) requires that the EPA approve the basic
state permitting and enforcement program, both as to legal authority and
as to the administrative structure and the funding necessary for carrying
out the state program; (2) allows the EPA to withdraw the state's author-
ity if necessary; (3) allows the EPA to act in place of the state within the
state's territory if the state program is not approved in the first instance
or if approval is later revoked; (4) allows the EPA to review every permit
issued, and to disapprove such permits and issue federal permits in their
stead if they are deemed to be insufficient under federal law; and, (5)
allows the EPA to enforce any state permit as to its federal aspects, if it
believes that a state is failing to take action where it ought to do so. 3
While we have yet to succeed in making environmental regulation
work perfectly in a federal system, we have done reasonably well in oper-
ating within a federal/state relationship that will never be static. The
importance of this point cannot be overemphasized in a world riven by
ethnic, religious, and other factional disputes. These disputes can in the
end only be resolved, given the realities of economic integration, by some
form of vertically integrated government. There is a spectrum of "fed-
eral" options that runs from tight, centralized systems on the one hand to
loose confederal ones on the other. The lessons to be learned from our
experience here are of paramount importance worldwide. We simply
have more experience making environmental regulation work effectively
in vertically integrated governmental systems than anyone else in the
world.
V. WHAT HAVE WE DONE WRONG?
The question next arises as to what we have done wrong, and why.
How can we and others learn from our chief mistakes? First, we have
had our priorities wrong from the outset, and are only now recovering.
On the whole, we did first what we knew how to do best, not what
needed doing most. We also did first what was politically easiest. We
were crisis driven to a large degree, or at least driven by the public's
perception of crises.
11. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
12. 2 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 8, § 12.0512][a].
13. See 2 id. § 12.05.
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To some extent this can be excused by our lack of knowledge at the
outset. We also did not have the risk assessment methodologies we now
have. Other countries, starting now to plow the same fields, can profit by
the general increase of knowledge.
Much of what we did at first was what the experts in the field knew
how to do. We started in the field of water pollution, for example, by
attacking conventional pollutants that sanitary engineers knew how to
treat with end-of-pipe controls,14 rather than the toxic, bioaccumulative
pollutants that they were less familiar with, that were at the time less
susceptible to easy field measurement at low levels, and that were harder
to control. We also dealt from the beginning with control of pollutant
discharges into air and water systems that have regenerative capacities,
in lieu of dealing first with less reversible matters like habitat destruction
and groundwater contamination. 5
Further, we tackled at the outset the obvious and politically attrac-
tive targets, like thermal discharges from large power plants operated by
private power companies,16 while ducking, under public and congres-
sional pressure, the less obvious or politically tougher issues that re-
quired voters to change their own behavior-such as the indirect air
pollution sources involved in shopping malls, stadiums, highways, and
other locations with aggregations of automobiles. 7
Finally, we reacted to crises of the moment, whether real or manu-
factured, and our actions were sometimes based on questionable science.
The point here is not that there were not real threats, and, indeed, per-
haps crises, nor that the threats should have been ignored. The point is
that judgment, discretion, and the best available science must be used to
identify and rank risks, preferably before they become real crises. Re-
sponse should be modulated so as to avoid crises, not be driven by them,
thus separating the real crises from the imagined ones. In a democracy,
14. The initial effluent guidelines adopted under § 304(b) of the Clean Water Act dealt
with a limited range of standard pollutants. It took litigation by environmental groups and a
reworking of the statute to force widespread consideration of toxins. See 2 id. § 12.05[2][a]
n.36, [3][a][iii][E].
15. The thrust of early efforts under the Clean Air and Water Acts was pollution control.
Only later did effective wetlands control develop under the Clean Water Act's regulatory pro-
visions and there is even yet no comprehensive federal regulatory control of discharges to
groundwater-although federal regulation of leaking waste facilities and underground tanks
does exist. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. III 1991); 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387
(West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
16. See, e.g., 2 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 8,
§ 12.05[3][a][iii][D].
17. See, e.g., 1 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.03[1], [12]
(1993); 2 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 8, § 11.08[3].
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this requires honest, straight talking by those on all sides of the issues,
rather than agenda driven game playing. It also requires unrelenting
public education.
In short, for all these reasons it can hardly be said that we engaged
in dispassionate analysis of all the likely problems and dealt first with the
ones that we thought most exigent. Sadly, many of these shortcomings
persist. Our penchant for fearing and regulating any substance we can
measure becomes increasingly untenable as our power to measure ex-
tremely low levels improves. The only long-run solution in a democratic
society is a higher level of sophistication in the public as to the risk, cost,
and benefit decisions we all make daily in our individual and collective
lives.
Second, we did not really understand the dynamics of environmen-
tal control in a market economy. While market failure and the economic
analysis of externalities were recognized aspects of environmental pollu-
tion, we did not at the outset approach the problem of environmental
regulation as one of restructuring the legal framework that sets the play-
ing field for economic behavior. For example, we originally chose com-
mand and control regulation as our primary method of regulation,
without any real consideration of market-based or market-driven forms
of regulation. This also is a problem that has persisted. My own view is
that command and control regulation must form the backbone of any
regulatory system, for a number of complicated reasons. It should be
market-sensitive, however, and should be supplemented by other forms
of market-based or market-driven regulation.
As another example, we adopted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)'8 with almost no
understanding of the inevitable impact of its new liability rules on prop-
erty prices and markets. We debate it today as if it were a matter chiefly
of tort law, rather than a fundamental alteration in the property law
framework within which the market operates, as it is for landowner re-
sponsibilities for on-site damage.
Third, much of our environmental legislation lacks coherence. It
was drafted by different and competing congressional committees. It
tended to be driven, as noted above, by the political problems of the mo-
ment. It got caught up in the institutional conflict between an executive
branch that wanted discretion to deal with these complicated matters
and a legislative branch that distrusted the executive. The result was a
legislative penchant for prescribing detail untenable for statutory legisla-
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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tion, and for legislatively overriding or extensively reworking certain spe-
cific decisions already made by the executive branch. The legislation was
also skewed by the pulling and hauling of the various interest groups in
the political process and by the resulting compromises during passage.
Some of the legislation that ensued, such as CERCLA and the Clean Air
Act, represents the worst of United States legislative drafting, and has
been salvaged only by great administrative skill, and sometimes courage,
at the EPA and by flexible and creative judicial review.
Fourth, we have had inadequate intellectual constructs for regulat-
ing some of the most significant subject areas. We developed fairly early
an economic externalities model that fit the plant pollution context. We,
or, more properly, the Europeans, are just now, however, beginning to
expand that basic model to the more complex, multi-actor problem of the
life cycle of such products as packaging, autos, and electronics. 19 Prod-
ucts cause external costs due to their design, manufacture, use, and dis-
posal, but the separate actions and decisions of many different people
along the way are responsible. Devising techniques that internalize the
proper costs at the proper points and give all the various actors better
incentives is a much more complex process than internalizing the costs of
air or water pollution at a factory.
We developed, after some debate, the models for use of cost-benefit
analysis in environmental decision making, but have never cracked many
of the practical valuation problems they involve, especially for
nonmarket environmental values. Nor have we come up with a neutral
valuation unit to replace dollars. We are also still struggling with
whether, how, and when to second guess the "scarcity" values that the
market presently assigns to nonrenewable natural resources.
Recently, we have developed "risk assessment" methodologies,20
but as with the cost-benefit theory, many of the detailed issues of practi-
cal application are not resolved. Outside of the analysis of single chemi-
cal substance risks, the effective everyday use of this tool-for example,
for an integrated assessment of all of the risks facing a population sur-
rounding an industrial facility-is still highly problematic. In the
meantime, we continue to regulate many risks in isolation, on a media-
by-media basis, and we are just beginning to deal with some of the rele-
vant pathway issues, such as sediment contamination.
19. See Select Committee on the European Communities: Packaging and Packaging Waste,
H.L. 1992-1993 (118) 38-50 (prepared memorandum and testimony of Turner T. Smith, Jr.);
Turner T. Smith & Lucas Bergkamp, Analysis and Perspective: Packaging Waste Developments
in Europe, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 522 (Sept. 25, 1991).
20. See, eg., 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (1986).
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We are developing other tools like biomonitoring2" and life-cycle
analysis,2 2 but it is only recently that they have gotten to the point where
they are useful. It may be some time before they are sufficiently precise
or objective that they can bear the weight of regulatory use in a disposi-
tive, rather an indicative manner. Biomonitoring, for example, is a useful
screening tool, but it is my view that chronic exposure tests are not yet
sufficiently reproducible or accurate to be used as the basis for enforcea-
ble permit effluent limitations. Likewise, life-cycle analysis is a useful
tool for corporate planning when judging the relative environmental im-
pacts of alternative courses of action, but is proving to be an inadequate
and misleading basis for regulating products, through eco-labelling, in
the market place.23
Fifth, much of the United States response to environmental
problems, starting with the "no discharge" goal of the Clean Water Act
24
and extending through the "best available technology" thrust of the
Clean Air Act25 to the "how clean is clean" issue under CERCLA,26 has
been quite unrealistic. We have not, when dealing with the natural envi-
ronment, focused sufficiently on the fact that it is ultimately the impact
on the human environment that counts, and that there are many trade-
offs with nonenvironmental factors that vitally affect human welfare. We
have, as a society, failed to appreciate the limitations on our economic
resources-we have not learned the basic "no free lunch" lesson. We
have frequently been unwilling even to acknowledge that hard choices
need to be made within environmental regulation, much less between en-
vironmental goals and other social goals. We have been unwilling to
concede that the right way to think about environmental policy issues is
in an economic framework, and by consideration of costs and benefits as
well as we can measure them. I am not here defending the specific use of
classical cost-benefit analysis in any particular application. I am rather
arguing that, like it or not, there is no other adequate conceptual frame-
21. Biomonitoring involves using the health of living organisms placed in waste effluent or
other tested substance as an indicator of the presence of pollutants. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 130.7(c)(1)(i), 131.11(b)(2) (1993).
22. Life-cycle analysis is an attempt to measure the total environmental impact of a prod-
uct over its life cycle from manufacture to disposal. Its use is prescribed in the European
Community's Eco-Labelling Regulation. See TURNER T. SMITH, THE CONFERENCE BOARD,
REPORT No. 1026, UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULAITON 15-20
(1993).
23. Frank Arnold, Life Cycle Doesn't Work, ENVTL. F., Sept./Oct. 1993, at 19 (1993).
24. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(1) (West 1986).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(1), 7521(c), 7521(f)(3)(B) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
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work for thinking logically and rationally about the public policy issues
we face in environmental regulation.
VI. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
Given these lessons from the past, where should we be going? In
general, we must try to agree on how to think about the problems. If we
can do so, then we can at least disagree with more clarity on particular
substantive issues. Disagreeing clearly may not be as good as agreeing,
but we are never likely all to agree on many of the issues involved in
environmental policy. Disagreeing clearly, if it could be achieved, is bet-
ter than the normal fog of battle that surrounds these issues.
Beyond this general point, we must attempt explicitly to deal with
the most important issues first. We need to develop a set of prioritizing
principles for doing so, one that takes into account the seriousness of the
problem, its immediacy, our likelihood of success in dealing with it, the
costs of doing so, and so on. In other contexts, we have developed hard-
headed triage principles to guide decision making where immediate ac-
tion is required and not everything can be done at once. We need such
principles here. Less developed countries need them even more.
Second, and related, we must learn to identify the basic "drivers" of
these problems. My list in this regard would include (1) population
growth, (2) war, (3) lack of economic growth 27 (4) lack of land use con-
trols in general, and (5) lack of urban planning and land use controls in
particular.
My discussion so far has proceeded on the implicit assumption that
some form of law and order exists. In an increasing number of places in
the world the drivers referred to above, as well as other factors, have
pushed the fabric of society to the breaking point-for example, Bosnia,
Somalia, and perhaps parts of West Africa-and thus this assumption
does not hold. It has been strongly argued that these situations and their
ecological implications create some of the most serious and intractable
global environmental problems we face, and that they are worsening.2"
In such situations, the types of policies and solutions I have been discuss-
ing can hardly even be contemplated until the first step is taken and some
form of government authority is reestablished.
I have no illusions that we will make real headway on these matters
globally, but even a glance at the living conditions of many of the people
27. Economic growth has two faces-while it causes environmental degradation when not
properly managed, it is most important as the essential means for funding environmental pro-
tection measures-beginning with those involved in basic sanitation and other health areas.
28. Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1994, at 44.
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on the planet makes clear how fundamental they are to the vast majority
of the problems we call environmental. Even if we cannot make headway
on them, it will clarify debate on dealing with their inevitable conse-
quences, and make us focus on the costs of opportunities foregone, if we
at least face up to the significance of their role and the fact that we are
not doing so.
Third, we should note that many of the truly difficult environmental
problems-deforestation, ozone depletion, resource depletion, trans-
boundary air and water pollution, and global warming-are global or at
least regional and multijurisdictional in nature. Not only are the factual
issues themselves complex and challenging, the need for collective, coor-
dinated multijurisdictional response makes the political problems
enormous.
The issues that most United States environmental lawyers spend
their time on, by contrast, are important in their context, but involve
inherently local impacts. Further, the regulatory issues that are the
stock-in-trade of United States environmental law today are second and
third level problems. We have already tackled many of the basic issues
with fair success. We are dealing in most cases now with "diminishing
returns"; in many cases, like CERCLA, we lavish more concern and re-
sources on problems than they are worth. Most of the rest of the world is
at a much more basic stage in dealing with the inherently local issues.
That is why even the basic lessons of our regulatory experience can be so
valuable to them.
One of the great tasks for United States environmental lawyers is to
redeploy some of the massive amounts of highly trained legal skills that
now serve narrow domestic ends-and to apply them to the overarching
global and regional environmental problems noted above. This will not
be easy because business clients pay lawyers only for what furthers their
immediate business purposes. The broader problems, on the whole, do
not impinge directly on them yet. Government funding is available for
some of the larger issues, but frequently not for legal-as opposed to
scientific, technical, or engineering-input. Redeployment is worth-
while, however, because the practical problem-solving skills developed by
United States environmental lawyers can prove useful, with appropriate
adjustments for the different cultural and legal contexts, in dealing with
the larger issues.
Fourth, we must now face up to the environmental problems that
cannot be solved by technological fixes alone. It is the "people"
problems that are the most difficult to deal with, particularly in a democ-
racy. Urban air pollution in general, and area source pollution in partic-
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ular, is a good example here. Another is the need to use land use
planning, before the fact, to reduce reliance on costly engineered solu-
tions designed to compensate for poor locational decisions. Clear think-
ing and a good case will be required, at the minimum, to persuade voters
to accept the major changes in life style and behavior that will be in-
volved. If solutions are achieved at all, however, they may be more ra-
tional than in the past. This is simply because the voters are likely to
prove a much harder sell than corporate America, when their own imme-
diate interests are at stake.
Fifth, within the context of the traditional regulatory issues with
which United States environmental lawyers are most familiar, we must
learn to deal with the more complex issues-the preservation and man-
agement of whole eco-systems, as opposed just to preserving isolated hab-
itats; product waste and nonrenewable resource use issues as well as
plant pollution problems; pollution prevention, as well as after-the-fact
controls; multisource, multipollutant and multipath solutions,29 as well
as the traditional single source, single media, single pollutant modeling
and permitting approach; market solutions to the allocational issues in-
volved in permitting; and the issues in regulating discharges, products or
resources in a multijurisdictional, as opposed to a single jurisdictional
context.30
Sixth, we must learn to approach every regulatory decision and
every issue of environmental policy with the recognition that we are nec-
essarily restructuring the envelope of allowable actions, and the incen-
tives, in a dynamic free-market system. Otherwise, we are forever
condemned to misunderstanding the reactions we will provoke among
the players, and to having markets constantly give them signals that un-
dermine the regulatory effort. Further, we fail in many cases to take
advantage, where we can, of the market system's existing incentives,
which can help us achieve decentralized, market-driven responses that
relieve us of direct command and control regulation. Whatever one
thinks of the relevance and usefulness of such matters as cost-benefit
analysis and other forms of consideration of costs in public decision mak-
ing on environmental issues, it is at least clear that any regulatory action
is taken on the market playing field. Failure to take this into account
explicitly in designing the regulatory approach is foolish.
29. For example, involving region or basin-wide permitting efforts; integrated, multimedia
permits, inspection and enforcement; best practicable environmental option concepts, et cetera.
30. I speak here of multijurisdictional issues in the horizontal or geographical aspect,
rather than in the vertical or federal aspect.
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Finally, it is now time to study the proper use of the various "tools"
of regulation in the law-making, law-applying, and law-enforcing areas.
It is important that we evaluate these tools, such as rule making, permit-
ting, registration, notification, certification, reporting, effluent fees, other
charges or taxes, administrative penalties, and so on. The point here is to
assess them in a generic way, across media, programs, and types of envi-
ronmental problems. By assessing the elements essential to their effective
use, their successes and failures, their strengths and weaknesses, and
their best and worst uses, we can begin to evolve general principles to
guide their application in various aspects of environmental regulation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The gist of my message is that while much has been learned in the
last twenty-five years of American environmental law, the field is yet
young. We are just now at the point where we and others can mine our
own extensive experience to develop both a coherent theory of effective
environmental regulation independent of a particular national legal sys-
tem or of particular economic systems, and a systematic but practical
understanding of the basic tools necessary for its implementation. Even
as we reformulate our views on these basics, however, we still face great
challenges in the more complex aspects of implementing environmental
regulation in a dynamic industrial market economy. Finally, lying be-
yond these issues, are the much greater challenges outside our borders, as
effective environmental regulation struggles to be born in a wide range of
different legal, economic, and cultural contexts around the globe. This is
the next great frontier of environmental law.
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